Abstract: This paper addresses the impact of FDI on the factor distribution of income in developing countries. We propose a theory that relies on the impacts of FDI on productive heterogeneity between …rms in a frictional labor market. We argue that FDI have two opposite e¤ects on the labor share: a negative force originated by market power and technological advance, and a positive force due to increased labor market competition between …rms. Then, we test this theory on aggregate panel data through …xed e¤ects and system-GMM estimations. We …nd a quantitatively meaningful U-shaped relationship between the labor share in the manufacturing sector and the ratio of FDI stock to GDP. However, most of the countries are stuck in the decreasing part of the curve, which we relate to multinationals'location choices.
Then, we test this theory on aggregate panel data through …xed e¤ect and system-GMM estimations. We …nd a (statistically meaningful) U-shaped relationship between the labor share in manufacturing sector and the ratio of FDI stock to GDP. However, most of the countries are stuck in the decreasing part of the curve, which we relate to multinational's location choices.
Labor shares have plunged over the past two/three decades in poor countries. Harrison (2002) "I would guess that the post-tax income of capital is privileged relative to the post-tax income of labor as a result of globalization and especially globalization that leads to openness of …nancial markets and not just of trade. For example, both evidence and theoretical logic make it quite clear that union wage premia are driven down by the openness of the world …nancial system and that the ability of capital to move o¤shore really does pose limits on the wage-setting or wage-bargaining strategies of trade unions which are restrained in their wage demands by the higher elasticity of labor demand."
This borrows from Rodrik (1997) who explains that the current wave of globalization mainly increases the relative mobility of capital vis-à-vis labor. This has received some support from recent papers that examine how trade and capital account openness a¤ect the labor share of income 1 . These papers mostly underline the side e¤ects of globalization, casting doubt on the relevance of policies that advertise more trade and …nancial openness.
This paper makes four contributions. First, and most importantly, this provides a simple frictional model of the labor market tailored to think about the impacts of FDI and …nancial openness on the labor share of income in the host country. Second, we argue that FDI can have negative e¤ects on the labor share of income, even though foreign …rms pay higher wages than local …rms and FDI bene…t all the workers. Third, we suggest that there should be a reversal in the relationship between FDI and the labor share. At least, we claim that the labor share cost of FDI decreases with FDI level. Fourth, we examine the relevance of the theory on aggregate data.
In the theoretical part of the paper, we present a two-sector static model in which local and foreign …rms coexist. Foreign …rms are more productive than local …rms 2 , but they face higher entry costs. Such entry costs for the foreign …rms have two components. On the one hand, they parameterize the degree of …nancial openness. This component is related to the institutions that shape the attractiveness of the amounts between 7% to 23% of the mean labor share in our sample. FDI have substantially contributed to falling labor shares in these countries.
This paper relates to two strands of literature.
First, we contribute to the ongoing debate on the e¤ects of FDI on the factor distribution of output in the host country. Most of the literature focuses on wage inequality (recent theoretical contributions include Liang and Mai, 2003 , Marjit et al, 2004 , and Das, 2005 , and displays mixed evidence in favor of the thesis according to which FDI cause wage inequality, either at industry level 3 or country level 4 . By contrast, we focus on the labor share. A decrease in labor share originated by FDI in ‡ows may indicate that the overall bene…ts accruing to globalization are captured by foreign investors, with unchanged standard of living for the population. This is especially true when the host country fails to design the …scal tools to tax the bene…ts made by …rms …nanced by foreign capital. FDI-induced falls in labor shares in developing countries also strengthen the protectionist view according to which developed economies
should not trade with low-wage countries. These di¤erent e¤ects are likely to give political support against FDI and the multinationals, both in developed and developing countries.
Second, this paper is related to the growing literature on globalization and labor market frictions. while Davidson et al (2006) discuss the outsourcing of high-skill jobs. Our paper complements these contributions in two ways. On the one hand, we are interested in the labor share rather than in unemployment and wage dispersion/inequality. On the other hand, we focus on the host economy rather than on the home country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model. Section 3 discusses extensions dealing with microeconomic implications, FDI learning, transfer pricing, technological transfers, and capital choice. Section 4 contains the empirical part of the paper. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Environment
The model is static. There are two …nal goods entering preferences symmetrically. Each good is produced within an autonomous sector. There are a continuum of workers normalized to one and a continuum of …rms. Workers are homogenous. Firms are not. Foreign …rms di¤er from local …rms. The labor market 3 Feenstra and Hanson (1997) on Mexico, Figini and Görg (1999) on Ireland and Taylor and Dri¢ eld (2005) on the UK …nd a positive e¤ect of FDI on wage inequality, while Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) on the US do not …nd any signi…cant e¤ects. 4 Tsai (1995) and Gopinath and Chen (2003) …nd that FDI has increased wage inequality only in a subset of developing countries, while Basu and Guariglia (2006) …nd a more general relationship. Figini and Görg (2006) argue that the positive e¤ect of FDI on wage inequality decreases with development.
is characterized by frictions. Matching frictions aim at capturing a feature that especially applies to developing countries, the poor ability of people to generate wage competition between potential employers.
Each …rm, foreign or local, is endowed with a single job slot. Foreign …rms are more productive than local …rms: the amount of output produced by a foreign and a local …rm are respectively y F and y R with y F > y R . This re ‡ects the technological advance of foreign …rms (so that total factor productivity is higher), and/or their better access to the …nancial market (so that capital intensity is higher).
Before searching for a worker and starting to produce, a …rm has to pay the entry cost c > 0. This is a shadow cost as in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) . This assumption means that …rms make pure pro…ts.
If c was an actual cost, these pro…ts would be dissipated in entry costs. The entry cost is proportional to output and di¤ers according to the nationality of the owners. Hence, c F is the entry cost per unit of output of a foreign …rm, and c R stands for the entry cost of local …rms. We assume that c F > c R .
The cost c R represents the local di¢ culties to set up a …rm. This cost measures the formal and informal di¢ culties to set up new businesses (product market regulations, knowledge of recruitment procedures and network of potential employees). The cost c F has three components: general di¢ culties to open a new business c R , imperfect …nancial openness c O , and opportunity cost of entry . Formally,
Imperfect …nancial openness is associated to the existence of capital controls and restrictions on international transactions for foreign investors. Foreign investors may also face higher administrative costs (because they have to learn local regulations), or information costs (they have to learn how to recruit their employees). Rising …nancial openness translates into a lower cost c O 0. Opportunity costs of entry result from multinationals' alternative location choices. These alternative locations o¤er alternative rewards.
Workers and vacancies meet at the sector level according to the matching technology M i = M (u i ; n i ).
Here, u i stands for the number of job-seekers in sector i and n i stands for the number of vacancies in the same sector. The matching technology M is homogenous of degree one to ensure that the unemployment rate does not depend on the number of traders in the economy. It is also strictly increasing in both arguments, strictly concave, and bounded by min fu i ; n i g. Workers search jobs in both sectors. Hence,
Firms choose one sector before opening their vacancy. Given such assumptions, M (1; n i ) = m(n i ) is the probability for a given worker to receive an o¤er from sector i. It is increasing in n i . Similarly, m(n i )=n i is the probability for a …rm to meet a worker. It is decreasing in n i .
Firms set wages. If a worker receives a unique o¤er, he is paid the monopsony wage. For simplicity, the market value of outside opportunities is normalized to zero, and so is the monopsony wage. If a worker receives two o¤ers, one from each sector, …rms enter Bertrand competition to attach labor services. Therefore, the model is static, but it features some of the properties of dynamic models with on-the-job search.
Labor market equilibrium
The model only admits symmetric equilibria. This has two implications. First, in equilibrium, prices of the two goods are the same, and we normalize the common price to one. Second, the proportion of foreign …rms in the total number of …rms is also the same in each sector. As a result, we can drop indices i speci…c to sectors.
We …rst consider wage determination. The probability that a worker receives a single job o¤er is 2m(n)(1 m(n)). Then, the wage is nil and the …rm gets the whole output. The probability of receiving two o¤ers is m (n) 2 . Then, the wage depends on the productivity of the two …rms. With probability
(1 ) 2 , the two o¤ers emanate from local …rms and the worker receives output y R . With probability
(1 ), one of the o¤ers comes from a foreign …rm, and the other comes from a local …rm. Then, the worker is hired by the foreign …rm and his wage is y R . The …rm gets the di¤erence y F y R . Finally, with probability 2 , the two o¤ers come from foreign …rms. Then, the worker gets the marginal product y F .
Expected pro…ts for the two types of …rms are:
Firms enter the two sectors until pro…ts cover the shadow costs. In equilibrium, R = F = 0.
These two equations simultaneously de…ne , the proportion of foreign …rm in each sector, and n, the total number of …rms in each sector. The system can be solved recursively. The free-entry condition (4) for the local …rms determines the total number of …rms n. Then, the free-entry condition (3) determines the proportion of foreign …rms . It is easy to check that c F > c R together with y F > y R imply that there exists a unique equilibrium with a non-trivial proportion of foreign …rms.
The reason why the total number of …rms only depends on the e¤ective entry cost faced by local …rms is the following. If c F decreases, pro…ts for foreign …rms become positive. New foreign …rms enter as result. Since c R remains constant, pro…t expectations for local …rms become negative as they …nd more di¢ cult to recruit a worker. The number of local …rms goes down until the total number of …rms goes back to its initial value.
Foreign …rms'entry cost is c F = c R + c O + . Therefore, rising …nancial openness as well as falling outside pro…t opportunities do not modify the total number of …rms, but increase the proportion of foreign …rms -applying the implicit function theorem to equations (3) and (4) shows that dn=dc F = 0 and d =dc F < 0. An increase in productivity gap (y F y R ) =y R has similar e¤ects to an increase in …nancial openness. This increases the proportion of foreign …rms, but does not impact the total number of …rms.
Labor share
The total wage bill paid by foreign …rms is
The wage bill corresponds to workers who receive two o¤ers. This happens with probability m (n) 2 .
With probability 2 the two o¤ers are from foreign …rms and the worker receives the totality of output y R . With probability 2 (1 ), one of the two o¤ers is from a local …rm, and the worker gets y R .
The total wage bill paid by local …rms is
Wages correspond to workers who receive two o¤ers from local …rms.
Total output in foreign …rms is
The probability that a worker does not receive a job o¤er from a foreign …rm is (1 m (n) ) 2 .
Therefore, the probability that a worker receives an o¤er from such …rms is 1 (1 m (n) ) 2 . However, the worker may receive two o¤ers from such …rms with probability m (n) 2 2 . But, only one of the …rms hires him. Hence, we subtract m (n) 2 2 . The result follows.
Similarly, total output in local …rms is
Total wage bill is W = W F + W R , while total output is Y = Y F + Y R . After simple algebra, we obtain
2.4 Impact of foreign …rms on the labor share
In this sub-section, we analyse how the labor share responds to changes in foreign …rms' entry cost.
First, entry costs only a¤ect the labor share through e¤ective changes in the proportion of foreign …rms.
Second, there is a U-shaped relationship between the labor share and the proportion of foreign …rms.
Finally, multinationals' opportunity costs of entry limit the e¤ectiveness of openness policies, and may forbid the possibility to reach the increasing part of the curve.
The gap in entry costs paid by foreign and local …rms is c F c R = c O + . This gap depends on the degree of …nancial openness, which determines c O , and alternative pro…t opportunities, which determine . According to the free-entry conditions (3) and (4), changes in either one or both of these cost components only lead to changes in the proportion of foreign …rms in the total number of …rms.
Therefore, to capture the impact of a decrease in foreign …rms'entry cost, we only need to di¤erentiate LS given by equation (9) with respect to . We obtain:
wage com p etition e¤ect (10) Two opposite forces are involved:
The technological gap e¤ ect tends to decrease the labor share. An increase in the proportion of foreign …rms raises output, as they bene…t from better productivity. At given wage, this reduces the labor share.
This e¤ect depends on the ability of foreign …rms to extract a rent on labor thanks to their better technology.
The wage competition e¤ ect tends to increase the labor share. An increase in the proportion of foreign …rms raises wage competition between them, which increases wages. At given output, this tends to raise the labor share.
The impact of foreign …rms' entry cost on the labor share results from the interplay between these two forces. After simple algebra, we get:
Hence, dLS=d is non-monotonic in . It decreases at …rst, reaches a minimum, and …nally increases.
The technological rent e¤ect initially dominates, while it is dominated at larger proportion of foreign …rms. The threshold proportion of foreign …rms below (above) which increased …nancial openness deteriorates (raises) the labor share results from dLS=d = 0. We …nd
The pattern of the labor share with respect to the proportion of foreign …rms re ‡ects the pattern of productive heterogeneity among …rms. The labor share is the same when there are no foreign investors (c F su¢ ciently large, which implies that = 0), and when output is only produced by foreign …rms (c R = c F , which implies that = 1). For these two extreme cases: Figure 1 depicts the U-shaped relationship between the proportion of foreign …rms and the labor share.
Increasing …nancial openness or reducing outside pro…ts means moving along the curve from the left to the right. These variables only a¤ect the labor share to the extent they alter the proportion of foreign …rms. Financial openness has no impact per se. This prediction di¤ers from Rodrik-type models in which the labor share decreases with institutional openness (see Harrison, 2002 , for instance).
It is important to disentangle costs induced by imperfect …nancial openness c O from opportunity costs . Governments can alter the degree of …nancial openness; however, they cannot reduce pro…t opportunities in alternative countries. The proportion of foreign …rms easily responds to …nancial openness policies at early stages of …nancial openess. It is, therefore, easy to go along the decreasing part of the curve. However, opportunity costs of entry limit the ability of openness policies to reach the increasing part of the curve. In Figure 1 , is the proportion of foreign …rms implied by the entry cost c F = c R + .
This constraint may be so tight that is actually lower than .
In our empirical analysis, we will show that most of the developing countries are actually stuck on the decreasing part of the locus. In line with the current discussion, we will argue that this is implied by multinationals'alternative pro…t locations. 
Extensions and discussions
This section discusses various aspects of our model. We start by examining changes in the labor share between foreign and local …rms. Then, we consider four extensions to our model: FDI learning, transfer pricing, technological transfers, and capital choice.
Micro predictions
In this sub-section, we focus on wages in local and foreign …rms. First, foreign …rms pay higher wages than local …rms. Second, foreign …rms may pay higher wages per unit of output, and originate a negative wage externality on local …rms.
The labor shares in foreign and local …rms can be computed from equations (6), (8), (5) and (7) . We obtain:
Average wage paid by type-i …rms is
Foreign …rms pay better wages than local …rms do. However, the labor share may either be higher or lower in foreign …rms. Here, two e¤ects compete. The …rst e¤ect is intuitive: foreign …rms are more productive, which tends to decrease the labor share at given wage. However, they also pay better wages:
each time a foreign and a local …rm compete to attract a worker, the worker ends up being paid in the foreign …rm, while the job is destroyed in the local …rm. For instance, when the proportion of foreign …rm is very low, 0, LS R m= (2 m) and LS F my R =y F . When the productivity di¤erential is large, LS F <LS R as the former e¤ect suggests. When the productivity di¤erential is low, LS F >LS R .
It is easy to show that dLS R =d < 0. The labor share as well as the average wage paid by local …rms decreases with the proportion of foreign …rms. Consider a worker contacted by a local …rm. With probability 1 m (n), he does not receive an alternative o¤er. In such a case, he works for his local employer and receives the monopsony wage (0). With probability m (n), he receives an alternative o¤er.
With probability 1 , this o¤er comes from another local employer. In such a case, the worker is hired by a local …rm, and he is paid at marginal product y R . With probability , the o¤er comes from a foreign employer. Then, the worker is hired by the foreign …rm. To summarize, the probability of being hired by a local …rm is equal to 1 m (n) + m (n) (1 ) = 1 m (n) , while the probability of receiving marginal product conditional on being recruited by a local …rm is m (n) (1 ) . The latter probability goes down with foreign …rms'proportion, which explains the declines in labor share and average wage in local …rms.
Local …rms cannot compete with foreign …rms to attach labor services. Local …rms that survive an increase in the proportion of foreign …rms are …rms whose workers are more likely not to bene…t from any other o¤er. Consider the case where the proportion of foreign …rms is very large, i.e. 1. In that case, either the worker does not receive an alternative o¤er, or he receives an o¤er from a foreign …rm. In the former case, he gets the monopsony wage in the local …rm. In the latter case, he works in a foreign …rm.
Hence, the only workers hired by local …rms receive the monopsony wage and the labor share is minimal in such …rms (here, 0).
This result is in accordance with the empirical estimates of Aitken et al (1996) . They explore the impact of FDI on wages in Mexico, Venezuela and United States. They …nd that FDI are associated with higher wages. However, in Mexico and Venezuela, foreign investment has a negative impact on the wage paid by domestic …rms. This negative e¤ect is statistically signi…cant in Venezuela, while it is not in Mexico. Aitken et al argue that this impact might be due to the fact that foreign …rms select the best workers, or to the fact that the entry of foreign investment has coincided with a decline in the productivity of domestically owned plants. We tell another story that is based on matching frictions and wage competition between potential employers.
In foreign …rms,
Hence, the labor share and the average wage paid by foreign …rms can either decrease or increase with the proportion of foreign …rms. This increases whenever the productivity di¤erential between foreign and local …rms is su¢ ciently large, and/or the matching probability is su¢ ciently high. For instance, the labor share increases with when the labor market is perfectly competitive ( = 1).
Accounting for FDI learning
In this sub-section, we examine the argument according to which foreign …rms'entry makes easier the entry of new …rms. This may give birth to multiple equilibria: low equilibria with few FDI, small output, but a high labor share, would coexist with equilibria with large FDI and high output, while the level of the labor share would either be higher or lower. Interestingly, this assumption does not alter the relationship between the labor share and the proportion of foreign …rms.
We introduce FDI learning as follows: we assume that foreign …rms'entry cost c F is decreasing in -likely through the openness component c o . The model is unchanged, but the free-entry equation that de…nes the proportion of foreign …rms. The equilibrium vector ( ; n) now solves:
The total number of …rms n remains the same: this only depends on local …rms'entry cost c R . Foreign …rms'proportion is de…ned by equation (17) . There is a multiplier e¤ect. Both the right-hand side and the left-hand side of equation (17) are decreasing in . This e¤ect may originate multiple equilibria, with same number of jobs, same unemployment rate, but di¤erent proportions of foreign …rms. Equilibria have the following properties. First, given that foreign …rms are more productive, equilibria in which foreign …rms'proportion is high are also equilibria in which GDP per capita is high. Second, given that the relationship between foreign …rms' proportion and the labor share is unchanged, equilibria with a high proportion of foreign …rms may feature a higher or lower labor share than equilibria with a low proportion of foreign …rms.
This extension has a major implication. Two countries characterized by the same institutions in terms of …nancial openness may attract very di¤erent numbers of foreign …rms. It means that de jure measures of …nancial openness may be poorly related to the labor share, while de facto measures of foreign capital should be more accurate 5 . In the empirical part of the paper, we mainly focus on such de facto measures, even though some of our regressions also include an institutional measure of …nancial openness among the regressors.
Accounting for transfer pricing
In this sub-section, we introduce transfer pricing into our model, and examine how this alters the nonmonotonic relationship between …nancial openness and the labor share. We show that either the relationship is qualitatively unchanged, or it is strictly increasing.
In our basic framework, we implicitly assume that …rms cannot choose where to locate the valueadded. There exist lots of …scal tools for a multinational …rm to locate pro…ts of its subsidiaries where taxation is more pro…table. The most famous is probably the transfer pricing method. Consider the following example. Suppose that a multinational owns a single subsidiary. The subsidiary sells 100 units of an electronic component to the multinational. The price paid by the multinational is $10 each for a cost of $5 each paid by the subsidiary. Using the component as input, the multinational produces a …nal consumption good which is sold $1500 to the consumers. There are no taxes on pro…ts in the multinational country of origin whereas those taxes are about 50% in the subsidiary's country. So, aftertax multinational pro…t is $500, while after-tax subsidiary pro…t is $250. Hence, total pro…t is $750.
Changing the price of the component, the multinational can increase its total pro…t. For instance, if component had been sold $5, the total bene…t would have been $1000. Firms transfer the surplus where taxes are low by changing the transfer price of intra-…rm trade.
There are legal limits to transfer pricing, which is considered as …scal escape. In developing countries, local authorities do not want to lose …scal takings. In developed countries, custom o¢ cers do not want to lose part of tax receipts due to tari¤s on international trade. Custom o¢ cers are in charge to verify that intra-…rm trade is achieved at market prices 6 . However, countries di¤er in how much they enforce transfer pricing rules, and there is evidence of transfer price manipulation (see Hines, 1997 Hines, , 1999 .
If multinationals use transfer pricing to make pro…t of their subsidiaries lower, our story may not work any longer. Consider the case of a multinational that opens a subsidiary in a developing country very closed to foreign investments. In our story, output increases by a lot, but wages do not change very much.
Hence the labor share goes down. However, if the multinational locates its pro…ts in another country through transfer pricing, the labor share increases, because most of registered production achieved by the subsidiary corresponds to wage payments 7 .
Our framework must be enriched to account for pro…t shifting. We assume that foreign …rms can locate a proportion 1 of their pro…ts in another country. The model is unchanged, but the de…nition of output produced by foreign …rms. Indeed, the value-added located within the country corresponds to the wage bill plus the share of the pro…ts:
After simpli…cation, the labor share is worth:
When the country is closed (i.e. c F is su¢ ciently large so that there are only local …rms and = 0),
we have the same result as before:
When the country is perfectly open (i.e. c F = c R so that there are only foreign …rms and = 1), the labor share becomes:
Hence, the labor share should be larger when the economy is perfectly open than when it is perfectly closed. More generally, transfer-pricing reduces the size of the technological rent e¤ect. This does not 6 In case of homogeneous goods, the transfer price can be compared easily to the world market price. Controls are more di¢ cult when the good is very di¤erentiated from competitors. There are two methods in this case. First, if a …rm sells the same good to several other …rms in the same multinational structure, the transfer price must be the same for all …rms. The second method is to apply a mark-up on average cost to de…ne a theoretical transfer price. 7 Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) make use of this fact to evaluate the response of pro…t shifting to changes in corporate taxes in OECD countries.
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This condition is satis…ed when the productivity di¤erential (y F y R ) =y R between foreign and local …rms is large.
The main message of this extension is that pro…t shifting cannot arti…cially create a negative or Ushaped relationship between …nancial openness and the LS. In the empirical part of the paper, we …nd such a U-shaped relationship, which, therefore, cannot be due to transfer pricing.
Accounting for technological transfers
In this sub-section, we introduce technological transfers from foreign to local …rms and examine how they alter the relationship between the proportion of foreign …rms'entry cost and the labor share. As far as foreign …rms have positive spillover e¤ects on local …rms, the technological rent e¤ect tends to decrease with the size of the spillover e¤ect.
We assume that output produced by local …rms depends on the proportion of foreign …rms, i.e.
y R = y R ( ). The spillover may be either positive -in case of technological transfers -or negative -in case foreign …rms reduce the ability of local …rms to attract local investors, or destroy the network of connections that local …rms have 8 .
A positive spillover has a stabilizing e¤ect. An increase in the proportion of foreign …rms reduces the technological gap between foreign and local …rms. Foreign …rms must pay a higher wage as a result, which reduces the incentives to further invest in the country. A negative spillover has a multiplier e¤ect.
An increase in the proportion of foreign …rms raises the technological gap. Wages go down in foreign …rms. This attracts new foreign investors. When this e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, there maybe multiple equilibria: equilibria with a large number of foreign …rms and low wages, and equilibria with a low number of foreign …rms and high wages.
As far as there exists a unique equilibrium, a decrease in entry cost c F raises the proportion of foreign …rms. We can still study the derivative of the labor share with respect to such a proportion:
wage com p etition e¤ect
As LS< m (n) = (2 m (n)), the technological transfer e¤ect has the sign of y 0 R ( ). The sign as well as the size of the technological transfer e¤ect depends on the sign and magnitude of the spillover. When the spillover is positive, the technological transfer e¤ect tends to reduce the technological gap e¤ect.
Conversely, when the spillover e¤ect is negative, the technological transfer e¤ect tends to magnify the technological gap e¤ect. This extension delivers a major lesson. If one wants to capture the relationship between the proportion of foreign …rms and the labor share, one should also control for the technological di¤erential between foreign and local …rms.
Accounting for capital choice
Our basic model abstracts from capital choice. In this sub-section, we allow …rms to set their capital intensity. We also make the di¤erence between foreign and local …rms, which may face di¤erent capital costs. Provided that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is lower than one, a decrease in foreign …rms'entry cost can raise the labor share by increasing average capital intensity.
Let k denote capital intensity, and assume that output is y (k), with y (0) = 0, y 0 (k) > 0, and
The elasticity of output with respect to capital intensity is (k)
The rental cost of capital is asymmetric. Local …rms face the price r R , while foreign …rms face the price r F r R . To simplify, capital investment is made once the worker is recruited.
Capital intensity results from the equality between marginal productivity and marginal cost of capital: This implies that foreign …rms are more productive than local …rms, simply because the former can invest at lower marginal cost than the latter. The labor share is:
where y i = y (k i ), and i = (k i ), i = F; R. As r R tends to r F , foreign and local …rms are no longer di¤erent, and the labor share tends to
The labor share is composed of two terms, of which the …rst is the elasticity of output with respect to labor, and the second accounts for monopsony power derived from search frictions. As m (n) ! 1, the second term tends to one and we are back to the competitive model.
A marginal increase in induced by a marginal decline in c F has the following impacts:
wage com p etition e¤ect (27) The wage competition e¤ect now depends on the competitive wage di¤erential (1 F ) y F (1 R ) y R , rather than on the output di¤erential y F y R . Given that k F > k R , we have R > F whenever the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is lower than one. The wage competition e¤ect is magni…ed when capital and labor are complementary. This point has important implications for the empirical analysis. In the empirical part of the paper (next section), changes in are captured by changes in FDI stock to GDP ratio. This means that changes in and changes in total capital held by foreign …rms are observationally equivalent. This may induce a spurious positive impact of FDI stock to GDP ratio on the labor share: an increase in such a ratio may simply raise aggregate capital intensity. It follows that one must control for changes in aggregate capital intensity while trying to …nd an empirical relationship between the proportion of foreign …rms and the labor share. In the empirical part of the paper, regressions include a proxy for capital intensity.
From the theory to the empirical analysis
The theoretical model explains the labor share of income as a function of exogenous parameters, among which the degree of …nancial openness, foreign …rms' opportunity cost of entry, and the cost to set up jobs. However, these parameters only a¤ect the labor share because they have an impact on endogenous variables like the vacancy/unemployment ratio, or the proportion of jobs in foreign …rms. Formally, the labor share is a function LS( ; m (n) ; k; ) where is a set of exogenous parameters. Our empirical analysis consists in estimating a linearized version of this equation, allowing for a quadratic impact of the variable .
Empirical analysis
This section examines the relationship between the size of economic activity due to foreign …rms and the labor share. We use panel data covering developing countries. Fixed e¤ects estimations show that the stock of inward FDI to GDP has a non-monotonic impact on the labor share: decreasing at …rst, and then increasing. The threshold above which the labor share starts increasing with FDI is in the range 160-180%. Most of the countries are stuck in the decreasing part of the curve. This relationship appears robust to the consideration of outliers, to endogeneity and autocorrelation problems, and to the introduction of globalization variables. The other determinants of the labor share are in line with the theoretical model, especially the technological gap (-), unemployment rate (-), and capital intensity (weakly +).
Data
The data set covers 94 developing countries over the period 1980-2000. We consider all available countries whose GDP per capita was lower than 60% of the US one in 1980. There are very few self-employed workers in the manufacturing sector.
Furthermore, there is a cut-o¤ concerning the number of employees under which the …rm is excluded from the survey. The main drawback of this variable is that wages do not include employers' contributions.
This tends to underestimate the labor shares. This problem is not very serious for our purpose, because we do not proceed to international comparisons. All our estimates include country …xed e¤ects. Fixed e¤ects models use within country variations to estimate the desired parameters. However, there may be changes over time in the labor shares that are only driven by changes in employers'contribution rates.
Part of these changes will be captured by time dummies and by a variable that is highly correlated to GDP per capita.
The key explicative variable is the proportion of foreign …rms. We use two di¤erent proxies: the ratio of (inward) FDI stock to GDP (FDI/Y), and the ratio of FDI stock to total capital stock (FDI/K). The former ratio is available from UNCTAD for 200 countries over the period 1980-2005. The latter ratio is computed from UNCTAD data on FDI stock and from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) for the capital stock. FDI refers to equity participation over 10%. Such investments indicate that foreign investors play 9 The labor share is the ratio of wage bill to value-added. The self-employed contribute to the denominator, but typically do not appear in the denominator. There are several ways to impute a …ctious wage to the self-employed (see Bernanke and Gürkayanak, 2001, and Gollin, 2002) . These methods require strong assumptions on such a …ctious wage, as well as data on self-employment. Focusing on the manufacturing sector does not require to manipulate the gross wage bill to output ratio.
an active role in the management of the …rm. These …rms are more likely to bene…t from technological advance. Of course, other …rms may also bene…t from foreign investment. The presumption here is that the percentage of jobs concerned by our analysis is highly correlated with the ratio of FDI stock to GDP and/or the ratio of FDI stock to capital.
Stocks are computed from the historical record of FDI in ‡ows given by the balance of payments.
Capital account data have been criticized recently on the ground that they fail to account for the valuation e¤ect 10 . We also use data on FDI stocks provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) , which correct for the valuation e¤ect. These data are available over the longer period 1970-2005 and allow us to test the robustness of our results.
The theoretical model suggests that the impact of FDI on the labor share depends on the technological gap TG= (y F y R ) =y F between the host economy which receives FDI and the home-based transnational …rm. Unfortunately, there are no statistics for the mean productivity di¤erential y R =y F between local and foreign …rms. As a proxy for this variable, we use the ratio of local GDP per capita to US GDP per capita, both measured at purchasing power parity. The technological gap variable is measured accordingly by one minus the latter ratio.
The labor share also depends on the matching probability m (n). This probability shapes workers' ability to generate wage competition for their services. This probability is not available as such. However, we use the following property of our model. The probability of staying unemployed coincides with the unemployment rate. It is equal to UNR= (1 m (n)) 2 . Therefore, we use the unemployment rate as a proxy for (one minus) the matching probability. This variable is available for a limited number of years and countries.
Finally, we must separate the impact of FDI from changes in overall capital intensity, as discussed in subsection 3.5. We consider the ratio of capital stock to output K/Y rather than the ratio of capital stock to labor. The former ratio is governed by changes in the ratio of capital stock to e¤ective units of labor. Unfortunately, the UNIDO dataset does not allow us to compute a reliable capital stock series -in many cases, the number of observations is clearly insu¢ cient. Therefore, we use the ratio I/Y of investment to value added. We perform sensitivity regressions with the overall capital to output ratio.
Some regressions include a measure of trade openness (OPENT, the usual openness degree, that is the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP), a measure of de jure capital account openness (OPENK) (the composite index constructed by Chinn and Ito, 2006), a dummy variable (CRISIS) that takes the value 1 when the exchange rate falls by more than 25%.
Descriptive statistics for the core variables used in our regressions are shown in Table 1 . 
Core regressions
Let i denote the country and t the period. We aim to estimate the following …xed e¤ects model: Third, the two other variables that our model emphasizes have the predicted negative impact. In columns a to d, the technological gap (TG) has a negative sign, in line with our argument whereby foreign …rms use their technological advance to derive extra rents on the labor market. A country which GDP per capita is half the US one has a labor share that is lower than the US by about 10 to 15 points.
However, TG is highly correlated to GDP per capita, which means that TG captures a variety of factors that are embodied in GDP per capita. The unemployment rate (UNR) has a strong negative impact on the labor share.
Fourth, the parameter associated to capital intensity (K/Y) has a positive sign -yet it is not always signi…cant. This indicates that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is lower than one.
The fact that capital and labor are complementary in output is not controversial, at least in developing countries (see for instance Du¤y and Papageorgiou, 2000).
Fifth, Table 2 
Understanding the results
In this sub-section, we check the robustness of the relationship between FDI stock to GDP and the labor share. There are three main reasons why this statistical relationship may be spurious: existence of outliers, endogeneity and autocorrelation biases, and omitted globalization variables that causes both FDI and the labor share.
We …rst start with outliers. Figure 3 plots the partial relationship between the labor share and the ratio of FDI stock to GDP. 11 This displays two main features. First, there are some outliers, but they do not seem to drive the global negative impact of FDI. Second, Figure 3 visually con…rms that most of the sample is below the threshold. The ‡at and increasing parts of the curve are due to a very few countries.
The countries that drive the positive part of the curve are Hong-Kong, Ireland, Macao, and Singapore.
These countries have two characteristics: they have experienced impressive growth rates over the period, and they have attracted enormous amounts of FDI. These two features are related. High growth rates imply high pro…t opportunities for the multinationals and foreign investors in general. In terms of our model, the e¤ective cost of entry c F is very low in these countries, not only because of …nancial openness To con…rm that view, we run the regressions over various alterations of the initial sample. Table 3 displays the results. We …rst compute the empirical distribution of percentage change in LS ( LS it /LS it ).
Then, we omit the observations belonging to the top 5 and top 10 percentile of this distribution, and run …xed e¤ects regressions. The results are reported in columns a and b. The magnitude of the relationship between FDI/Y and LS is slightly reduced, but still signi…cant. Columns c and d omit observations where the FDI stock to GDP is larger than 100% and 75% respectively 12 . As expected, these regressions fail to identify the positive part of the curve. Column e restricts the sample to countries whose GDP per capita was lower than 50% of the US one in 1980. The results are very similar to the initial estimates.
TABLE 3
We then discuss endogeneity and autocorrelation biases.
Endogeneity may arise for two reasons. On the one hand, the regressors may be correlated with the error terms in the …xed e¤ects model. The explicative variables and the labor share are general equilibrium variables. As such, they may be a¤ected by correlated shocks, generating a statistical bias in the …xed e¤ects estimator. Regressions displayed in Table 2 and Table 3 Autocorrelation is a serious problem with panel data. Table 2 To address these two sources of bias, we use the system-GMM estimator due to Blundell and Bond (1998) . This estimator reveals more stable to sample and instrument alterations than the Arellano-Bond di¤erence estimator. Formally, the model is written as follows:
where all the variables have been centered in their period mean to account for common period shocks.
The model has two components: the di¤erence and level submodels. In both components, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error terms and must be instrumented. In addition, FDI terms may also be weakly exogenous, which also requires an instrumenting strategy. In the lack of good instruments, the set of instruments only contains lagged endogenous regressors and exogenous variables.
In the di¤erence submodel, the di¤erenced lagged labor share is instrumented by past levels of the labor share (from LS it 2 ), while the lagged labor share is instrumented by past di¤erences of the labor share in the level submodel (from LS it 1 ). This generates a large number of instruments in GMM-style. The set of instruments is …nally reduced by collapsing the matrix of GMM-style instruments 13 .
The model is estimated by two-step GMM, while reported squared errors feature Windmeijer correction. This method corrects for individual heteroskedasticity, arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation within individuals, and downward squared-error bias in …nite sample. The various columns di¤er in the number of lags that we consider for the various endogenous variables.
The number of instruments goes from 69 to 12. Clearly, 69 is too much with respect to the number of countries, 61. Column h displays the results of a standard …xed e¤ects regression, where we restrict the sample to the one e¤ectively used by system-GMM estimations.
The results are remarkably consistent across the various system-GMM estimations. Parameter a 1 is about 0.65, which is lower than a unit root, but su¢ ciently high to prefer the system-GMM estimator smaller than the initial one. Second, endogeneity a¤ects both the decreasing and increasing parts of the curve. Once purged from endogeneity bias, the true relationship reveals more modest by 10-40%. Third, the statistical method itself may weaken the relationship. For those reasons, we interpret the GMM …ndings as a lower bound on the magnitude of the true relationship between FDI and the labor share.
Finally, we discuss other globalization variables. They have received some attention in the recent past, and they may be correlated with both FDI and the labor share. Table 5 introduces a new set of regressors that deal with these various aspects of globalization: institutional …nancial openness, international trade, and, following Diwan (2000 Diwan ( , 2002 , exchange rate crises. TABLE 5   Table 5 shows that globalization variables do not a¤ect the relationship between FDI and the labor share. In particular, institutional …nancial openness does not lower the labor share. The variable OPENK However, Harrison considers FDI ‡ows (rather than stocks as we do), and Ortega and Rodriguez do not control for FDI variables. Table 5 displays a non-signi…cant parameter.
Sensitivity analysis
In this sub-section, we further investigate the robustness of our results. We proceed in four steps. First, we consider various de…nitions of the FDI variable. Second, we extend our dataset to richer countries, and we consider the ratio of aggregate capital stock to output as a proxy for capital intensity. Third, we estimate our model on 4-year mean data rather than yearly data, we estimate a probit version of the regression, and we perform cluster estimates of the coe¢ cients.
In Table 6 , we consider several alterations in the main explicative variable, i.e. the ratio of FDI stock to GDP. Column a reproduces our benchmark regression: FDI stock is from UNCTAD, and it is divided TABLE 6   Tables 7a to 8b show di¤erent sensitivity tests. In Tables 7a and 8a , the regressions do not include the unemployment rate, while it is included in Tables 7b and 8b.   TABLE 7a   TABLE 7b In columns a and b of each Table, regressions are run on developed rather than developing countries.
We have included the countries whose technological gap was below 40% in 1980. There is no relationship between FDI and the labor share as a result. Interestingly, trade openness has a negative impact, as In columns k and l, the ratio of investment to output in the manufacturing sector is replaced with the aggregate ratio of capital to output. This does not a¤ect the estimates .   TABLE 8a   TABLE 8b 5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the impact of FDI on the factor distribution of income in developing countries. We build on the idea that FDI increase productive heterogeneity within …rms acting in the host country.
Foreign …rms are more productive, and, in a frictional labor market, only need to pay slightly more than local competitors to attract workers. This explains why the labor share falls with FDI. At some point, the magnitude of foreign …rms in host activity may become so large that productive heterogeneity starts going down. The labor share would then increase with FDI. The paper o¤ers a search-theoretic model that allows to discuss these two e¤ects, and tests the main predictions on aggregate data through …xed e¤ect and system-GMM estimations.
Policy implications of our work are non-ambiguous. Average wage always increases with …nancial openness, whether the labor share increases or not. Workers'welfare improves as a result. In addition, the negative e¤ects of FDI decline with FDI stock to GDP ratio. The largest e¤ects of FDI on the labor share arise at early stages of …nancial openness. Such negative e¤ects should not be considered at the time of evaluating the impact of a further increase in …nancial openness, unless one is willing to considerably overestimate them.
Fundamentally, we point out a negative relationship between productive heterogeneity and the labor share of income. This relationship naturally arises in the context of globalization where modern …rms can meet technologically obsolete and under-equipped competitors. However, this also happens in times of rapid technological change with emerging industries. To some extent, the information revolution and Robust standard in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressors are one-period lagged. For columns a and b, we compute the distribution of % change in LS. We then omit the observations corresponding to the top 5% and top 10% of such a distribution. 
) Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Columns a to f report two-step system-GMM estimates with robust standard errors in brackets. In a to e, FDI/Y and FDI/Y² are considered exogenous. They are supposed predetermined in f. The set of instruments contains levels and differences of the specified lags of the various endogenous regressors, and levels and differences of exogenous explicatives. Estimations have been achieved using the Stata command xtabond2. The number of GMM-style instruments has been reduced using the option collapse. Lines Sargan and Hansen provide the P-values for the Sargan and Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions. The null is that instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Line AR(2) is the P-value for the Arellano-Bond second-order auto-correlation test. The null is that errors in the difference regression do not exhibit second-order correlation. Lags' indicates the range of lags that has been considered for the endogenous variables. The first figure is the first lag, and the second figure is the last lag. Column h reports the estimates of a standard fixed-effect regression on the subsample data effectively used by system-GMM estimates. No observations  224  223  57  57  373  373  373  373  373  373  429  428  No countries  20  19  22  21  43  42  43  42  43  42  44 43 Robust standard errors in brackets unless specified. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressors are one-period lagged, but columns d and e. Developed means that the sample only contains countries whose GDP per capita was larger than 60% of the US one in 1980. Probit means that we consider a logistic transform of the dependent variable. Columns g to j feature clusterized estimates. 'cluster 1' means that each country is a cluster, while 'cluster 2' means that the sample is clusterized by income class. No observations  229  298  107  123  557  662  557  662  557  662  748  924  No countries  17  17  39  40  53  50  53  50  53  50  64 62 Robust standard errors in brackets unless specified. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressors are one-period lagged, but columns d and e. Developed means that the sample only contains countries whose GDP per capita was larger than 60% of the US one in 1980. Probit means that we consider a logistic transform of the dependent variable. Columns g to j feature clusterized estimates. 'cluster 1' means that each country is a cluster, while 'cluster 2' means that the sample is clusterized by income class. No observations  216  216  53  53  340  340  340  340  340  276  429  428  No countries  17  17  19  19  39  38  39  38  39  34  44 43 Robust standard errors in brackets unless specified. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressors are one-period lagged, but columns d and e. Developed means that the sample only contains countries whose GDP per capita was larger than 60% of the US one in 1980. Probit means that we consider a logistic transform of the dependent variable. Columns g to j feature clusterized estimates. 'cluster 1' means that each country is a cluster, while 'cluster 2' means that the sample is clusterized by income class.
